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ABSTRACT
Personalization should take the human person seriously. This re-
quires a deeper understanding of how recommender systems can
shape both our self-understanding and identity. We unpack key
European humanistic and philosophical ideas underlying the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and propose a new par-
adigm of humanistic personalization. Humanistic personalization
responds to the IEEE’s call for Ethically Aligned Design (EAD) and
is based on fundamental human capacities and values. Humanistic
personalization focuses on narrative accuracy: the subjective fit be-
tween a person’s self-narrative and both the input (personal data)
and output of a recommender system. In doing so, we re-frame the
distinction between implicit and explicit data collection as one of
nonconscious (“organismic”) behavior and conscious (“reflective”)
action. This distinction raises important ethical and interpretive
issues related to agency, self-understanding, and political partici-
pation. Finally, we discuss how an emphasis on narrative accuracy
can reduce opportunities for epistemic injustice done to data sub-
jects.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning-backed personalized services, among them rec-
ommender systems (RS), have become a permanent fixture in our
increasingly digital lives. Personalization relies on vast quantities
of behavioral big data (BBD): the personal data generated when hu-
mans interact with apps, devices, and social networks [94]. Besides
supplying bases for recommendations and “hypernudges” [112] to-
wards these recommendations, BBD are the essential raw material
of our digital representations. But to what extent do these logged
digital behaviors truly reflect who we are as persons?
As life steadily moves online, the digital representations of per-
sons take on legal and moral importance [106]. Influential Euro-
pean legal theorists and philosophers have even written an Onlife
Manifesto, shaping the discourse around what it means to be hu-
man in the digital age [40]. At the same time, the IEEE has artic-
ulated a vision of Ethically Aligned Design (EAD) that empowers
“individuals to curate their identities and manage the ethical impli-
cations of their data” [4].
The current domain of RS is largely focused on problems of
“practical identity,” which include various methods for construct-
ing, identifying, and linking various data representations of users
[27, 70]. In contrast, philosophers and social scientists are con-
cerned with issues of moral, social, and increasingly, the narrative
identities of persons. This separation of spheres of activity is no
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longer acceptable given the potential effects RS can have on the
person.We thus proposehumanistic personalization (HP) as a novel
guide for thinking about and designing personalized RS. The HP
paradigm of mutual, dialogic participation obliges RS designers to
promote and respect the unique capacities of persons to create and
modify personal narratives over time.
Our paper builds on but differs from recent work on RS value-
alignment [99], self-actualization [65], qualitative evaluation met-
rics [76], and the epistemic and ethical problems of over-reliance
on behavioral data [35].
Most notably, we use the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) as the basis for ethical and legal norms instead of adding to
the current morass of competing principles, guidelines, and frame-
works for Ethical AI/ML (see e.g., [79]). Tying ethical principles
to legal norms via the GDPR is valuable because, in principle, the
GDPR applies to any data controller processing the personal data
of data subjects residing in the EU [52]. Further, law is institutionally-
backed to achieve greater behavioral compliance via the state’s mo-
nopoly on the legitimate use of physical force [18, 56]. Thus our
conception of HP is likely to foster greater compliance by industry
and researchers around the globe, even if some minor details of
the GDPR have not yet been fully worked-out. In sum, we believe
the GDPR provides a solid grounding for deep humanistic design
principles relevant to RS, a view shared by a number of European
legal scholars [59, 60].
Second, we re-frame [35]’s distinction between implicit/explicit
feedback as one between conscious action and non-conscious be-
havior and perception. This has philosophical and moral implica-
tions for RS users.
Third, we cast doubt on the meaning of the structural regularity
of said observed behavioral data, which are encoded and parame-
terized by the machine learning (ML) algorithms used to generate
recommendations. We suggest these regularities may more reflect
the structure of platform affordances rather than a person’s under-
lying preferences. In this way, debates in the philosophy of soci-
ology (e.g., the structure-agency debate) may provide insights into
areas where personalization is currently weak. A final and absolute
determination of person’s “true” preferences or interests may not
be possible–a conclusion which dovetails with postmodern theory
and complexity theory [58]. The upshot of this diagnosis is that
giving data subjects a constructive voice in the meaning and inter-
pretation of digitally recorded events may be our best option. We
introduce the legal basis supporting such a conclusion.
1.1 The Recommender Systems View
Conventional collaborative filtering (CF)–the dominant paradigm
in personalized recommendation–relies primarily on implicit data
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collection to drive recommendations [23]. CF leverages implicit
data to determine a focal user’s “nearest neighbors” [16] and rec-
ommends items bought or consumed by the “neighbors,” but not
yet by the focal user. In many large-scale production systems, im-
plicit data take the formof browsing history, ratingmetadata, search
queries, and social graphs. Implicit data collection relieves users of
the task of explicitly rating items and can be easily automated and
scaled [80]. Implicit data are a type of BBD.
During personalization, a user is represented roughly as follows.
Database representations of a person–tabularized collections of
logged behaviors in apps or on devices–are converted into feature
vectors, permitting the computation of various proximity metrics
between pairs of vectors. Next, “neighborhoods” are derived from
the set of neighbors in feature space deemed closest to a given user,
according to a distance metric. A 10-dimensional feature vector
represents a person as an array of 10 numbers, obtained from mea-
surements of observed behavior, thereby replacing the personwith
a single point in 10-dimensional feature space. To reduce compu-
tational costs, the dimensions of the original user-item matrix are
often reduced into a lower “latent space” by techniques such as
singular value decomposition (SVD). Recently, deep learning ap-
proaches to RS have used stacked denoising autoencoders to gen-
erate latent representations of users [109]. Digital representations
of persons thus take the form of feature sets of narrow, observed
behaviors within an app or device and exclude their unique mental
states, social and moral identities and personal narratives.
1.2 A Humanist Critique of BBD-based RS
The behavioral focus of CF personalization exposes it to the same
criticisms of behaviorism. Behaviorism rejects the study of causal
cognitivemechanisms of human behavior (beliefs, intentions, goals,
values) in favor of measurable features of the behavioral environ-
ment [98]. The behaviorist model of the human person (abstracted
to an “organism”) is inherently at oddswith that of the GDPR. BBD-
based models are what a humanist might describe as a “caricature”:
a model not only overly simplistic and approximate, but which ac-
tively distorts reality [49].
In the case of CFs, behaviors measured are self-interestedly cho-
sen by BBD platforms (e.g., Facebook or Google) and often driven
by business–not scientific or ethical–goals, such as click through
rate, engagement, or conversion. Further, the ability to manipulate
digital environments at the individual level– hypernudges–obscures
reliable interpretation of observed behaviors. This problem is par-
ticularly relevant for RS using online learning, such as deep rein-
forcement learning [114].
Philosophers of science have long understood thatmeasurement
itself is a form of representation. As Bas Van Fraassen notes, “a
measurement outcome does not display what the measured entity
is like, but what it ’looks like’ in the measurement set-up” [107].
The act of measuring something “locates it in an ordered space
of possible measurement outcomes,” where this ordered space is
built into the measuring instrument [6]. Likewise, observations
produced by instrumentation (e.g., phones or apps) are inherently
perspectival: they are sensitive only to a particular type of input
and are never perfectly transparent [50]. Behavioral data are more
precisely capta, or the “units that have been selected and harvested
from the sum of all potential data” [64].
Feature sets of narrowly defined and observed (logged) behav-
iors within an app or device constitute our digital representations.
Yet themeaning of observed behaviors are under-determined since
they could spring from a variety of possible mental states. By leav-
ing out mental states, social and moral identity, and narrative as-
pects of human experience, BBD-based models of persons are rep-
resentations merely by “stipulative fiat” [17] of RS designers, not
because they capture essential aspects of a person.
1.3 Two Philosophical Views of Persons and
Personal Data
The act of inferring personal interests through digital behavior–
the ostensible goal of personalization–leads to deep philosophical
questions. For instance a) What kind of objects are our data rep-
resentations? and b) What is the relation between parts (measure-
ments) and wholes (persons), especially when a global objective
function is optimized?
Two influential accounts of how persons and personal data re-
late exist in the philosophy of information and marketing litera-
ture. Yet we find both views to be legally and morally problematic.
Our purpose in introducing these two points of view is not to at-
tempt to hash out their metaphysical details, but instead to intro-
duce readers to a new way of thinking about the complexities of
technologically-mediated being. We describe each view next.
You (Really) are Your Data. The Oxford philosopher of information
Luciano [39] endorses what we term a “realist” view of personal
data. He maintains, “You are your information,’ so that anything
done to your information is done to you, not to your belongings.”
To Floridi, personal data do not represent you, but rather constitute
you as you: your personal identity and your personal data are func-
tionally equivalent, though at different levels of abstraction. Floridi
contends that the GDPR’s rights to informational privacy protect
the constitution of one’s identity. If data processors alter or delete
personal data about you, they also alter or delete aspects of your
personal identity.
Floridi’s view confers strong privacy safeguards for data subjects–
Facebook’s Emotional Contagion experiment [66] would be tan-
tamount to psychological abuse. But Floridi’s view falls short for
other reasons. Persons have rights, personal data do not. Data can
be nearly infinitely cloned and copied, persons cannot. Further, if
Floridi is right, identity theft would be akin to literal kidnapping
[96]. Moreover, Floridi’s view overstates the importance of how
others classify us. Our social identities indeed depend on how oth-
ers label us, but we are capable of choosing to reject this label.
Lastly, Floridi does not provide any account of why certain kinds
of personal data are more sensitive than others.
Dividuals: Persons or Posthumans? Postmodernmarketing researchers
and cultural theorists take a different approach. For them, databases
and nowRS construct dividuals: digital entities derived frommasses
of individuals’ personal data [21]. Dividuals are, in the words of
poststructuralistphilosopher Gilles Deleuze, “cybernetic subject[s]
made up of data points, codes, and passwords” [29]. Matrix de-
composition techniques, such as SVD, combine and re-assemble
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personal data to birth new marketable entities separate from the
persons from whom they were derived. The resulting posthuman
assemblages are variously termed data doubles, capta shadows and
digital personas [64].
This interpretation of digital identity is also problematic. Un-
der the GDPR, only natural living persons have rights–dividuals
are outside the scope of the GDPR. Facebook’s above-mentioned
study would be legally and ethically kosher. Second, personaliza-
tion does not divide up individual persons, but rather their digital
representations. Unlike human individuals, nothing about these
digital representations demands they remain unified wholes. Fi-
nally, recommendations must ultimately be linked to actual living
persons through unique identifiers, but it is unclear how dividuals
relate to the persons from whom they were derived. While the di-
vidual is an interesting metaphor, it has limited applicability in the
real world.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we
consider and critique the various epistemological and ethical blindspots
of many current BBD-based RS based on ML algorithms (e.g., CF
and reinforcement learning). Next, we lay out the legal and philo-
sophical groundwork underlying the GDPR. We argue the con-
ceptual seeds of humanistic personalization are rooted in the le-
gal principles of a right to personality and in informational self-
determination.We then connect these principles to the ideas of key
Enlightenment and Romanticist thinkers, and derive some insights
for RS design. Following that, we respond to the IEEE’s call for
EAD by introducing the notion of narrative accuracy and its com-
plement, epistemic injustice [44]. The goal of narrative accuracy
is to align predictions and explanations of RS with one’s personal
narrative. Finally, we consider potential dangers in emphasizing
human subjectivity through narrative and discuss possible com-
promises. Ultimately, we hope this work contributes to the concep-
tual foundations of participatory design of recommender systems
[7, 35], and third paradigm HCI [55].
2 THE COMPLEXITIES OF HUMAN
BEHAVIOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE
We currently reside in what technologist Eli Pariser calls the “un-
canny valley of personalization” [82, pg. 65]. Users know recom-
mendations derive from our digital representations, but are often
not quite sure how orwhy. Escaping this “uncanny valley” requires
new, reflective perspectives on the design and impact of AI/ML.
Our notion of HP envisions a shift from an implicit, behavior-based
representation paradigm, dominated by our “organismic” interests,
to one centered on conscious, explicit feedback [35] through the
notion of dialogic narrative construction.
Driving our discussion is a distinction we make between con-
scious action and nonconscious “stimulus-response” behavior. The
difference is essentially between “what an agent does” and “what
merely happens to him” [42]. Philosophers have traditionally asso-
ciated intentional action with conscious, rational beings and mere
behavior with non-conscious states. Importantly for our arguments
here, narrative identity presupposes conscious reflection and re-
counting of events. We realize there is a lot of grey area, but we
believe our contentions to be supported by the emerging literature
in cognitive psychology.
Our main point in this section is simple. We assert that it is
not that case that current RS personalization is so incredibly ac-
curate, but that we, as linguistic, social, and physically-embodied
animals, have deceived ourselves as to our potential for free move-
ment and thought. In reality, much of what we do is conditioned by
the perceived features of our social, physical, and now digital en-
vironments. This idea may seem obvious now, but it took philoso-
phers centuries to overturn the Cartesian dualism between mind
and body and realize the boundaries between subject and object
were not clear and distinct. Our bodies, for instance, shape our
perceptions of the world and our choice of linguistic metaphors
[67].
On top of this, the increasing ubiquity of digital environments
further limits and constrains what is humanly possible. Perhaps
even worse, as degrees of freedom in digital environments are re-
duced, hermeneutic1 problems of human action arise and present
ethical problems. For one, the behaviorist assumptions behind the
collection of implicit data fail to appreciate the important caveat
that “variable acts produce a constant result” [87]. When complex
behaviors are broken down into overly-narrow “sub-symbolic” cat-
egories by BBD platforms and RS designers, intentions become de-
coupled from results. 2 What is more, a clear one-to-one mapping
of intentions to actions becomes impossible. One cannot intend to
do what one cannot first identify. Misinterpretation appears baked
into digital life and is worsened when automated systems can dy-
namically change digital environments in real-time.
2.1 Ideomotor and Nonconscious Goal Directed
Behavior
More recently, neuroscientists and psychologists have studied how
our brains and perceptual systems evolved to make quick and rela-
tively accurate assessments of our social and natural environments,
resulting in the nonconscious guidance ofmental processes involved
in interpersonal behavior and goal pursuit [8, 57, pg. 44]. So al-
though the behaviorist paradigm in psychology is no longer dom-
inant, it was only partly misguided. Much of what we do is in-
deed determined by perceived environmental structures (e.g., af-
fordances) and evolutionary drives, many of which operate non-
consciously.
According to [46], ideomotor actions are “movements or behaviours
that are unconsciously initiated, usuallywithout an accompanying
sense of conscious control.” They are actions (in our sense, behav-
iors), typically triggered by environmental cues, that express in-
formation not consciously accessed. These researchers speculate
that “ideomotor actions, especially visually-guided ones, may re-
flect the operationof an ‘inner zombie’–a concurrent nonconscious
system expressed primarily via motor action” [46]. [36] explains
further, “After people have been implicitly primedwith cues closely
linked in their memorywith striving toward an end-point, they dis-
play behavior that meets classical criteria of motivation, such as
persistence and resumption after an interruption.” In other words,
1Hermeneutics dealt with the interpretation of biblical texts, but was revitalized as a
philosophical method of literary analysis in the 20th century.
2We note that the English word “category” traces back to the Greek kategoreisthai,
which means “publicly accuse.” [13, pg. 18]
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it can be impossible to tell from observation alone whether move-
ments are conscious actions or nonconscious behavior.
Yet new technology allows for the capture of increasingly fine-
grained movements. As one example of how nonconscious behav-
ior can potentially be leveraged by a RS, [19] describes a patent
for software correlating nonconscious elements of behavior with
users’ demographic characteristics. By analyzing the distinctive
patterns of mouse trajectories, for instance, inferences about non-
conscious activity can be drawn. The patent demonstrates how this
could be used to personalize the presentation of website content:
As individuals continue to become more accustomed
to using digital devices, and activities hosted on dig-
ital devices, the concept of tracking an individual’s
nonconscious behaviors using the digital devices be-
comes increasingly convenient... [a] web server can
prepare in real time what the next presentation and
interface should be in order to capture more of the
viewer’s attention by presenting the web content in
modalities which the viewer has nonconsciously se-
lected. Thus, content is directed via a Smart web server
to a viewer based on the viewer’s nonconscious selec-
tion.
On the flip side, if nonconscious behaviors are regular enough to
be detected by ML techniques, then this suggests we might use ML
to actively discount or re-weight behaviors in favor of conscious,
intentional action.
Moving now to the field of information retrieval, a major as-
sumption is that the user is driven by an “information need.” Even
when updated using Broder’s “trichotomy” of web search types
[14] to include informational, navigational, and transactional searches,
we still do not do justice to the complexities of humanmeaning and
context. Such a model of human behavior abstracts a person to the
level of its organismic interests. It is a caricature.
From a humanistic point of view, such research typically fails to
distinguish between conscious and nonconscious “interests” and
“goals.” As one example, [53] analyze mouse trajectories and scroll
patterns for the “intent to buy.” Researchers also typically overlook
key ethical implications of pre-defined “intent” categories, for ex-
ample, that intentions are assumed to either fall under “research”
or “buy.” For a philosopher, there is an important difference be-
tween behavior that is more or less evolutionarily hard-wired–
essentially stimulus-response–and what is the result of deliberate,
reasoned reflection on one’s personal values. Law also recognizes
a moral difference between the two.
Humans are more than mere information-seeking organisms. A
web query such as “how can I get a six pack in 30 days” and “how
can I help end human suffering” are both informational search
types driven by an assumed information need. Yet anyone but the
most die-hard positivist would argue these observed queries (treated
as bags ofwords) are qualitatively equivalent. Personalization should
take the person seriously. If we recognize the human capacity for
moral reflection, we have to treat the second search as inherently
more meaningful and worthy of pursuit than the first. The ques-
tion is, how might we design RS to promote this kind of reflective
endorsement of our desires?
2.2 Behavior Modification and Dark Patterns
Although controversial, behavior modification methods have been
used by major BBD platforms to control digital environments and
shape behavior towards “guaranteed outcomes” [115, pg. 201]. De-
rived from principles of behaviorist psychology, they are premised
on the idea that “once you understand the environmental events
that cause behaviors to occur, you can change the events in the
environment to alter behavior” [77, pg. 3]. A subset of these tech-
niques are the so-called “dark patterns” of design. Dark patterns
are cases where designers use their knowledge of human behavior
to implement deceptive functionality that is not in the user’s best
interest [51]. We note that no distinction is made between “organ-
ismic” and “reflective” interests here.
Many of these dark patterns stem from the ideas of influential
design gurus, such as BJ Fogg and Nir Eyal, who are candid about
the ways in which products3such as RS are “persuasive technolo-
gies,” based on “choice architectures” aimed at getting us “hooked.”
These persuasive techniques include reduction, tailoring, tunnel-
ing, suggestion, self-monitoring, surveillance, and conditioning [51].
Some dark patterns are especially relevant to RS design, such
as interface interference and forced action [51]. Typically, the ethics
of dark patterns are seen from the designer’s point of view. There
the question is, “Is it right to design this way?” We suggest there
is another equally interesting way to view persuasive technology
and dark patterns–from the user’s point of view. There the ques-
tion is: “If I didn’t consciously choose this, does this ‘choice’ reflect
anything deep about who I am?”
2.3 Problems with Context and Interpretation
Computer scientist Paul Dourish details how the positivist, Carte-
sian paradigm of clear and distinct separations of subject and ob-
ject, knower and knowledge, dominate computer system design
[34]. In the philosophically-informed version of HCI he advocates,
“our experience of the world is intimately tied to the ways in which
we act in it” [34, pg. 18]. On this view, questions about the “true”
boundaries of subject/object and system/environment are inher-
ently irresolvable. Dourish also highlights a key aspect between
what [35] call the intention/behavior gap. [34, pg. 137] explains:
When I click on the Buy now? button on aWeb page,
what matters to me is not that a database record has
been updated... but rather that, in a day or two, some-
one will turn up at my door carrying a copy of the
book for me. I act through the computer system. In
turn, this takes us to another element of the relation-
ship between embodied interaction and intentional-
ity.
RS research that accounts for this problem of one event having
two potential meanings is hard to find. In their work on context
aware recommender systems (CARS), [1] paradoxically claim they
rely on a “representational” approach and cite Dourish’s work. Yet
Dourish’s paper is aimed at explaining the ways in which “pos-
itivist/representational” thinking behind ubiquitous computing is
3RS can be seen as metaproducts: products which recommend other products.
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shortsighted and incomplete. He instead suggests drawing on “phe-
nomenological” and “embodied” approaches to understanding con-
text and its role in meaning creation. Dourish, however, does not
consider legal norms in his discussion of how designers can be
“nudged” to include these more nuanced, post-positivist concep-
tions of context into RS. We claim the GDPR provides grounds for
doing so, irrespective of the underlying economic or business logic.
2.4 Behavior as Text
The philosopher Paul Ricoeur connects language and behavior in
a unique way relevant to BBD and RS, and social science more gen-
erally. He holds that we can view behavior as text and thus apply
hermeneutic methods to its interpretation, much as we might to a
book or speech [88]. He calls this aspect of text distanciation. Dis-
tanciation breaks the link between writing and its original context
(and its intended audience), granting the text semantic autonomy
while also creating new problems of reference. Ricoeur alleges that
to understand a text, the reader must “unfold” the possibility of be-
ing indicated by the text, an act he refers to as appropriation [104,
pg. 55]. In other words, interpretation involves self-conscious re-
flection on both the proposed meaning of the text, and how such
a meaning might contribute to one’s own self-understanding in
relation to others (its author). Ricoeur claims the creativity of liter-
ary narrative and self-identity are driven by this process of “imag-
inative variations” on an underlying invariant structure of text or
character [89, pg. 148].
Once we understand digital behavior as text, we can go one step
further and apply the insights of Jacques Derrida towards the goal
of BBD interpretation. Derrida asserts that speech requires pres-
ence, which makes the context of the utterance clear [30]. Tradi-
tionally, you had to be near someone to hear what came from their
mouth. This nearness provided the context for the utterance: in
case of any confusion, its referent could be pointed to or gestured
at by the speaker. Meaning could be dialogically negotiated rela-
tively easily. But the power of writing is that it detaches the writ-
ten sign (the word/signifier/symbol) from the writer in its origi-
nal, intended context (the signified). Derrida claimed that writing
is the death of the author because it still functions as a sign in his
absence [31, pg. xli]. We can interpret the written mark in any con-
ceivable way once we have broken it from its original context of
production. Derrida’s point is this move from presence (speech) to
absence (writing) is both problematic and creative. Re-presentation
is an attempt to recreate the presence of the author of the text in
some new, different context.
The point in introducing Derrida is to show that once detached
from the presence of data subjects, personal data become “public
signs” which can be algorithmically manipulated and combined
in novel ways by RS designers. The downside is that we can now
never know the original “true” intention in the absence of the orig-
inal act of data production. We must be satisfied to re-present and
not present the author of the data. We thus face a crisis of interpre-
tation. What to do? If we follow the GDPR, we let the data subjects
themselves decide.
2.5 The Agency-Structure Debate and
Reinforcement Learning
Sociologist Anthony Giddens introduces the idea of structuration
to analyze how societies evolve in terms of systems, structures, and
rules. Systems are the relations between actors, organized as reg-
ular social practices, while structure is the unseen rules and re-
sources deriving from the system; finally, rules are procedures for
social interaction which constitute meaning and sanction various
conduct [71, pg. 59]. Structuration emphasizes the recursive dual-
ity of social structures–they have both synchronic and diachronic
aspects–implying that by performing behaviors and following rules,
agents simultaneously change and cement existing social struc-
tures.
In Giddens’ view, it is mistaken to believe there were agents
before societies, as was assumed by Locke or Hobbes. Instead, Gid-
dens argues all persons are born into existing societies, and social
structures pre-exist for them as the ongoing activities of members.
Agents become persons in a society, and by their actions within
it, reproduce and transform it. This view suggests two opposing
conclusions: the actions of agents in society are to some extent de-
termined by existing structures and rules in society, yet by acting
each actor transforms society and gives it a unique history. The
philosophical question is, how much of what we do in society is
determined by its structure and how much derives from our capac-
ity as free agents?
A similar question arises in our interactions with digital envi-
ronments. As an analogy, we can think of reinforcement learning
(RL) used in RS. The goal of such an RL system is to find an optimal
recommendation policy as it continually explores and exploits its
state space [45]. This adaptive process is what drives RL person-
alization and its various applications in search, ranking, and web-
page/app optimization. In the contextual bandit approach, for in-
stance, exploitation translates to recommending items predicted to
best match users’ preferences, while exploration translates to giv-
ing random recommendations hoping to receive more “feedback”
[114].
As one prominent example, Facebook uses its open source Hori-
zon platform to send “personalized” push notification and updates
to millions of users. [47] explains how Facebook uses a Markov
Decision Process (MDP) to serve personalized recommendations:
The Markov Decision Process is based on a sequence
of notification candidates for a particular person. The
actions here are sending and dropping the notifica-
tion, and the state describes a set of features about the
person and the notification candidate. There are re-
wards for interactions and activity on Facebook, with
a penalty for sending the notification to control the
volume of notifications sent. The policy optimizes for
the long term value and is able to capture incremen-
tal effects of sending the notification by comparing
the Q-values of the send and don’t send action.
Yet this approach poses many ethical questions, besides the ob-
vious ones related to using a set of predefined user features. The
other issue is the extent to which nonconscious goal-directed be-
havior may be driving many of the observed trajectories given a
specific policy. But there are deeper problems of interpretation due
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to the positivist formalization of RL, in which it is assumed the
truth is absolute, a collection of brute facts seen from a view from
nowhere (see, e.g., [33]).
First, the interpretations of states (e.g., the sets of categories de-
scribing the person and the notification) in the agent’s state space
are pre-defined by the system designers. Second, the interpreta-
tions of actions (e.g., sending and dropping notifications) in the
action space are defined by system designers. Third, rewards are
chosen by system designers and typically try to maximize things
like click through rate, dwell time, or business revenue, which may
have little to no value from the data subject’s perspective. Fourth,
any constraints on the set of allowable policies fromwithin the pol-
icy space are set by system designers. Taken together, these prob-
lems cast doubt on aspirations of personalization by RL systems,
if we are to take the person and his epistemic capacities seriously.
Few if any of the design parameters capture what the user would
reflectively endorse as the interpretation of an action or state, or
the selection of the reward to be maximized. These tensions sug-
gest an area ripe for research on how a person’s moral values can
influence choices such as the reward and criteria for allowable poli-
cies. We also see promise in connecting “teacher advice” for safe
exploration [45] by RL with persons’ moral values and personal
identities.
3 THE GDPR VIEW
This section lays out the basis for our reading of the GDPR, which
we believe supports a new focus on narrative accuracy as an ori-
enting ideal for RS. By the end, we hope to justify the legal scholar
Mireille Hildebrandt’s definition of privacy (in the European con-
text) as, “the freedom from unreasonable constraints on the con-
struction of one’s own identity” [60, pg. 80].
Spurred by revelations of US government surveillance programs,
the ubiquity of AI/ML in industry, and the “datafication” of soci-
ety, European policymakers aimed to re-conceive the role of dig-
ital technology in society [52]. Besides creating a “Single Digital
Market” across Europe, lawmakers also hoped to strengthen the
rights of individuals to protect and control their personal data. The
distinctive nature of the European experience and philosophical
tradition is reflected in the GDPR and distinguishes it from other
recent regulations in California (CCPA) and China (Cybersecurity
Law, CSL).
The result was the European Union’s 2018 General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR), which updated the 1995 Directive and
built on the legal foundations of the 2000 Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (CFR). The CFR recognizes funda-
mental rights to privacy and protection of personal data for all per-
sons in the “human community.” We note that one reason for up-
dating the 1995 Directive to the GDPR was tomaintain consistency
with the CFR’s rights to data protection and privacy [113]. Accord-
ingly, much of the content of the GDPR was included, not because
of anything related to technological advance or business concerns,
but because it was needed for legal coherence with broader Euro-
pean ideas about human rights and privacy.
The GDPR addresses the storage, collection, and processing of
personal data. The GDPR also regulates the automated processing
and algorithmic profiling of personal data. These terms were left
intentionally vague as to encompass future developments in tech-
nology [91]. In the language of theGDPR, data subjects are “natural
living persons”; personal data are “any information relating to an
identifiable natural person”; and algorithmic profiling is any kind
of “automated processing of personal data used to predict a natural
person’s interests or preferences” (among many other predictive
targets) with “significant” (legal or otherwise) effects on the nat-
ural living person. Personalization, and therefore RS, falls under
algorithmic profiling.
Unlike the US, where personal data processing occurs largely
via an “opt-out” mechanism, the European approach is based on
data subjects “opting-in” to processing [111]. In other words, EU
data subjects must decide to give consent to personal data process-
ing when other legal bases of processing are not present. When no
legal bases are present and the data subject has not consented to
the processing of his personal data, processing cannot take place.4
Under the GDPR, data subjects inherit many of the same rights
they had under the 1995 Directive, plus a few notable additions. Ar-
ticles 12-23 spell out these rights. Data subjects now enjoy the right
to be forgotten (data subjects can request deletion of their data) and
the right to data portability (data subjects can request a portable,
electronic copy of their data).
Generally speaking, the rights of data subjects under the GDPR
can be categorized as related to transparency (i.e., clear and un-
ambiguous consent, communication with data subjects should be
clear and easily intelligible), information and access (i.e., who col-
lected the data and for what purpose(s)), rectification and erasure
(i.e., allowing data subjects to correct false information and delete
old information), and objection to (automated) processing (i.e., re-
moving consent to processing of any personal data including algo-
rithmic decision-making).
The GDPR places emphasis on the broad social effects of per-
sonal data processing. Recital 4 states that the purpose of personal
data processing is to “serve mankind.” Consequently, an individ-
ual’s rights to object to processing are not absolute; they must be
weighed against broader societal benefits of such processing. The
process of weighing is called the principle of proportionality. An
example of such a right is the new right to be forgotten, which, in
some cases may conflict with the right to information access, and
other retrieval and archiving goals, especially when dealing with
publicly accountable figures, such as politicians [2]. In this sense,
the GDPR can be seen as taking somewhat of a utilitarian approach
to personal data processing.
3.1 Informational Self-determination and the
Right to Personality
Our goal is to articulate the underlying values of the GDPR and
use them to formulate foundational principles for RS design. These
principles are valuable because they have withstood intense philo-
sophical scrutiny over centuries. The rights given to data subjects
under the GDPR reflect a certain European understanding of the
human person and have evolved over time. Ultimately, from the
European perspective, data protection and privacy are tools aimed
at preserving human dignity [41, 69, pg. 89].
4Article 6 lays out the six lawful bases of personal data processing
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Accordingly, two crucial legal notionsmust be introduced: infor-
mational self-determination and its predecessor, the right to the free
development of one’s personality. Informational self-determination
is defined as “an individual’s control over the data and information
produced about him,” and is a necessary precondition for any kind
of human self-determination [92]. In turn, self-determination is a
precondition for “a free democratic society based on its citizens’
capacity to act and to cooperate” [92].
It isworth quoting the 1983German Federal Constitutional Court’s
decision to get a feel for its perspective [92]:
The standard to be applied is the general right to the
free development of one’s personality. The value and
dignity of the person based on free self-determination
as a member of the society is the focal point of the or-
der established by the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The
general personality right as laid down in Art. 2 (1)
and Art. 1 (2) GG serves to protect these values-apart
from other more specific guarantees of freedom-and
gains in importance if one bears in mind modern de-
velopmentswith attendant dangers to theHuman per-
sonality.
In sum, the right to informational self-determination derives
from a more basic and older right to the free development of one’s
personality, found in the German Basic Law. Self-determination is
necessary to uphold the dignity of the human person in society
and is inherently tied to one’s capacity for political participation.
This suggests that participatory design of recommender systems
could indirectly play a role in fostering political participation in
the public sphere.
We note that the European concept of freedom is not an “an-
archic” freedom that conceives of the person as distinct and sepa-
rable from society. Rather, it is broadly in line with more modern
social constructionist thinking that views language as a shared so-
cial activity. Language and knowledge are not something one pos-
sesses in one’s head, but “something people do”–as a “sociorational
process” deriving from a communal “negotiated intelligibility” [48].
We will return to these ideas when looking at Hegel’s thought.
3.2 Habermas and Political Participation
To really understand the GDPR and its view of the person, we must
view it within the broader context of the project of EU integration.
The EU must somehow unite many individual, self-determining
member states, each with its own history, culture, and language(s)
under a common EU flag. The European project is about how to
maintain national identity in the face of political integration and
homogenization [54]. In other words, how can the EU construct
a supranational identity while respecting the autonomy and self-
determined identity of member states? 5
The philosopher and social theorist Jürgen Habermas provides
an influential model to understand the European project and the
role of data protection in political participation. Building on the
Kantian/Enlightenment devotion to reason, Habermas views the
democratic process as fundamentally based on communication and
5In the case of the GDPR, individual member states have derogations (exceptions)
to spell out the details for their particular national implementations of the EU-wide
Regulation.
interaction with others in a public sphere of argument and debate
[54]. Habermas rejects the metaphysical idea of an abstract, ahis-
torical, and universal “truth,” replacing it instead with broad con-
sensus and intersubjective agreement arising from the application
of the process of communicative reason.
Truth claims are valid to the extent to which they were gener-
ated by a process of deliberative argument with others, in good
faith, and according to fundamental principles (pragmatics) of dis-
course. Instead of askingwhat amoral agent couldwill–while avoid-
ing self-contradiction–as a universal maxim for all, Habermas asks
what “norms or institutions would a communication community
agree to as representing their common interests after engaging in
a special kind of communication or conversation?” [10, pg. 24].
For Habermas, the role of the media is crucial in developing in-
formed personswho can function in the public sphere. Yet themass
media wields disproportional power to influence the opinions and
ideas of private persons, limiting their ability to engage in deliber-
ative politics [54]. Perhaps most importantly, mass media can lead
to passive a citizenry with little experience in face to face politi-
cal dialogue and its norms of reciprocity and argument. Further,
mass media have the power to influence public opinion through
the framing and selection of certain views and agendas at the ex-
pense of others.
Consequently, we can understand data protection regulation as
one antidote to the power asymmetries wielded by BBD platforms.
Persons should participate in the project of deliberating upon and
developing their own unique identities based on the personal data
they generate in apps and on devices. As the legal scholar [69, pg.
12] notes, data processing “exacerbates the information and power
asymmetries between individuals and those responsible for per-
sonal data processing.” In short, we see the GDPR as providing
the data subject with the legal rights necessary to be an informed
participant in one’s self-determination and identity formation. But
how should we understand the notion of identity as it relates to
BBD?
3.3 Humanistic Themes of the GDPR
We claim the GDPR echoes themes from both the European En-
lightenment and counter-Enlightenment. On the one hand, it stresses
the conscious, reflective, and rational aspects of identity construc-
tion. On the other, it emphasizes individual expression and rejects
the goals of scientific absolutism, reductionism, and determinism
[11]. As such, it aims to provide the minimally-necessary condi-
tions for the exercise of unique human capacities. These capacities,
identified and examined by key European philosophers, lay out the
basis for these rights.
We turn to philosophy because the grounds of human rights ul-
timately rest on moral considerations, not political ones. On this
view, the “fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life are var-
ious goods, capacities, and options that human beings qua human
beings need, whatever else they (qua individuals) might need, in
order to pursue the basic activities” [24, pg. 82]. As stated above,
this includes self-development and an ability to participate and col-
lectively deliberate in the political arena.
Explicit Consent, Article 7. The GDPR’s focus on explicit consent
for data collection and processing is one way in which conscious,
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reflective aspects of human experience are valued. For instance,
the European Data Protection Board (EPDB) recently clarified its
definition of clear and unambiguous consent to processing6:
Based on recital 32, actions such as scrolling or swip-
ing through a webpage or similar user activity will
not under any circumstances satisfy the requirement
of a clear and affirmative action: such actions may be
difficult to distinguish from other activity or interac-
tion by a user and therefore determining that an un-
ambiguous consent has been obtained will also not
be possible.
Right to Human Intervention (”Human in the Loop”), Article 22. Be-
sides allowing data subjects to opt-out of automated processing,
Article 22 has two key provisions: 1) data subjects have a right to
obtain human intervention; 2) data subjects can contest the auto-
mated decision (and can also access the personal data used to make
the decision) [113]. Additionally, data subjects must be “informed”
about any automated-processes and provided with “meaningful in-
formation” about the logic of the decisions and the possible con-
sequences of such automated-profiling (see, e.g., Recital 71). Such
“meaningful information” also includes the ability to “obtain an ex-
planation of the decision reached” (Recital 71).
Recommendations, particularly inmorally-salient contexts, such
as dating or job hunting, potentially fall under this provision.With-
out knowing that such profiling–even with a “human in the loop”–
is occurring, and without understanding how the profiling was
done, data subjects’ rights to due process7 may be undermined.
The GDPR’s treatment of automated profiling (personalization
in our case) belies an underlying distrust in the notion of quan-
tifying the human experience. This is a theme explicitly tackled
by German philosophers of the Sturm und Drang movement and
Romanticism more generally. Herder, for instance, eschewed the
Enlightenment tendency to fit the particular under the general pat-
tern, to quantify what he believed was inherently qualitative [11].
For him, truth and goodness were not ideal, static Platonic forms,
but relative to individuals residing in cultures with unique histo-
ries. If competing goals and values could not be resolved under a
general algorithm, as Romanticists such as Herder believed, then
keeping a human in the loop is one way to deal with the inevitable
problem of value conflict in the ethical realm. The Kierkegaardian
conflict of subsuming the infinitely complex individual under an
abstract universal rule also can be seen here [9]. We detail more of
these ideas in section 3.4.
The Right to Be Forgoen, Article 17. The genealogy of such a law
traces back to the French le droit à l’oubli (the “right of oblivion”)
which allowed convicted criminals who had served their time and
had been “rehabilitated” to object to the publication of certain facts
about their imprisonment [91]. Viviane Reding, thenVice-President
of the European Commission, claimed three goals for the right:
strengthening individuals’ rights to data protection, fostering an
6Accessed 30 June 2020, available at
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_202005_consent_en.pdf
7Due process is a foundational principle of modern legal systems guaranteeing that
procedures of the law are fairly applied to individuals. In the case of automated pro-
filing, due process means notification that one is being profiled and the existence of
some procedure through which one can contest the results of the profiling.
EU-wide “Digital Single Market,” and imposing greater responsi-
bility on data controllers.8 According to Reding, it is “important
to empower EU citizens, particularly teenagers, to be in control of
their own identity online.” 910 One question is whether this right
applies to, for example, CF-based RS trained on the data of users
who have exercised their right to be forgotten.
The right to be forgotten also mirrors the natural workings of au-
tobiographicalmemory, inwhich the act of forgetting is essential in
constructing a self-narrative over time [22]. Narratives are the out-
come of a continual cognitive process by which human experience
is shaped into “temporally meaningful episodes” [86]. Persons ac-
tively take part in constructing self-narratives to understand them-
selves, their behavior, and their roles in society [74]. The ability to
reconstruct one’s personal narrative is particularly important for
young people [72]. We explore narrative identity more deeply in
section 4.
Rights to Access and Modify Personal Data, Article 12. Against sci-
entific determinism, the GDPR upholds individual subjectivity and
expression in creating one’s digital representation [92], where the
very choice of exercising one’s rights inserts noise into the predic-
tive signal of our in-app and on-device behaviors. Data subjects’
rights to access, delete, and modify their personal data grant them
the ability to both more deeply understand themselves and subjec-
tively narrate their personal identities over time. Though the tech-
nological means for doing so are currently limited, data subjects
can already modify their names, their genders, and drop national-
ities [2] .
The right to modify one’s personal data to fit one’s life narrative
provides an expression of agency in that data subjects could poten-
tially choose the description under which their behaviors are under-
stood, thus solving what Pariser calls the “one identity problem”
of personalization [82, pg. 65]. The concept of reificiation is par-
ticularly applicable here. Reification is the process through which
people believe the contingent manifestations of ideology are under-
stood as facts of reality [85]. As the sociologists Berger and Luck-
mann write, “Reification is the failure to recognize that [social or-
der] as humanly engendered. The decisive question is whether one
still retains awareness that... the social world was made by men–
and therefore, can be remade by them”[85]. Put simply, the fear
is that, as BBD platforms increasingly collect our personal data,
their “thin” versions of our digital identities may begin to replace
our “thick” personal identities. In the extreme, these thin digital
identities may then be confused with our “true” ones, to our own
detriment.
As the process of reificiation shows, without the GDPR’s rights
to access and modify their personal data, data subjects may fail to
realize the extent to which their identities and behaviors have been
8Accessed August 2nd, 2020, available at
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_10_700
9Accessed August 2nd, 2020, available at
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_12_26
10[72] finds that young adults may experience any of several identity statuses when
exploring identity options and committing to identity goals. For our purposes, the
statuses of foreclosure and diffusion are most relevant. Young adults in foreclosure
have never fully “explored and questioned the goals and values that were available”
to them. Further, diffusion is when young adults fail to make any commitments: “they
do not know what they want (or value) in adult life, and they are not, at the moment,
looking to know” [75, pg. 193].
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classified according to the arbitrary rules of the BBD platform. RS
designers, in order to avoid this problem of “presumptuousness”
[63], could provide users with notifications to confirm their inten-
tions and goals. For example, one step towards this would be to
ask data subjects, “You did XYZ, but did you mean ABC?” Doing
so would give them the agency to decide the description under
which their behaviors should be understood.
Right to Data Portability, Article 20. Further, rights to access and
download one’s personal data in portable, machine-readable for-
mats permit the reflective endorsement of in-app and on-device be-
haviors. Coupled with open source data analytics platforms, data
subjects could potentially analyze their own personal data to learn
more about their captured behaviors on BBD platform. This is os-
tensibly the goal of the “quantified self” movement [68]. Down-
loading and then analyzing their own data allows data subjects to
put a mirror to themselves in a new way. Even if they discover
that their captured data bears no relation to their self-narratives,
they have seen themselves in a new light. Moreover, the dignity–
meaning the worth or fittingness–of the human person, a crucial
notion in the GDPR [41], is expressed in the focus on reflective en-
dorsement of behaviors and habits. The GDPR affirms the Socratic
belief that a life without this self-reflective capacity is not properly
a human life.
3.4 Key Thinkers of the Enlightenment and the
Romantic Movement
To illustrate some of the major threads from which we base our in-
terpretation of the GDPR, we will highlight the ideas of just a few
of themany Enlightenment and Romantic philosophers.We briefly
highlight ideas fromKant,Hegel, Hamann, Herder, and Kierkegaard
to bring out these themes.
Immanuel Kant. Kant’s attitudes towards autonomy, self-determination,
and the public use of reason are best illustrated by a short pas-
sage from his 1784 essay, Answering the Question: What Is Enlight-
enment?11
Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a
large part of mankind gladly remain minors all their
lives, long after nature has freed them from external
guidance. They are the reasons why it is so easy for
others to set themselves up as guardians. It is so com-
fortable to be a minor. If I have a book that thinks for
me, a pastor who acts as my conscience, a physician
who prescribes my diet, and so on–then I have no
need to exert myself. I have no need to think, if only
I can pay; others will take care of that disagreeable
business for me.
This excerpt reveals much about the European legal conception
of autonomy and self-determination through one’s critical use of
reason. Our dignity rests on our capacity for reason and is the nor-
mative foundation for securing various data protection and human
rights. To fail to exercise these rights is an affront to our dignity as
rational beings.We are obligated to use them to progress in our self-
understanding, to break free from our self-imposed immaturity.
11The German Unmündigkeit is here translated as minor, but has the sense of the
English immature or dependent.
As rational beings, we possess a potential much greater than our
habits, instincts and impulses. Realizing this potential, however,
requires courage. For Kant, passivity is the mark of immaturity–
thus we see Habermas emphasizing the process of communicative
action and critical debate in the public sphere.
In the modern context of RS, we see Kant’s disdain for the blind
acceptance of recommendations without critical reflection ofwhether
they might be reflectively endorsed by us [43]. We must dare to
know how these recommendations were made and understand the
kinds of personal data involved in generating them. For instance,
to what extent are they based on the predictive signals of our non-
conscious goal directed behaviors? What about when our in-app
behaviors are the result of dark patterns and hypernudges? Kant
would implore us to take an active role in the public debate around
the regulation of our personal data.
Besides his important contribution to Enlightenment thinking,
Kant’s metaphysical conclusions famously resulted in a distinction
of human knowledge into two domains: the intelligible (things in
themselves) and the sensible (things as they appear to us). Kant
concedes human knowledge has its limits, and we cannot know
things in themselves, though we may employ reason to speculate
on their nature. Insofar aswe possess reason and act “in accordance
with maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature,” we belong
to a “kingdom of ends,” although our physical bodies firmly reside
in the sensible, predictable realm of the natural world [83, pg. 130-
131]. For Kant, humans differ from other animals in this capacity
to choose right or wrong (to follow the categorical imperative12),
and this capacity grounds our ascription of moral desert.
Later influential “neo-Kantians,” such as Max Weber and Wil-
helm Dilthey, followed Kant’s split between lived mental experi-
ence and our corporeality and aimed to delineate the “human sci-
ences” from the natural sciences (i.e., Geisteswissenschaften and
Naturwissenschaften). Dilthey writes, “The hallmark of inner per-
ception consists in the reference of a fact to the self; the hallmark
of outer perception in the reference to the world” [32, pg. 36]. The
human sciences were different in that they allowed for not just ex-
planations of events, but for “understanding” (Verstehen) the phe-
nomenological experience of persons [32]. This ontological differ-
ence requires different epistemological methods of inquiry. ForDilthey,
themethodwas “epistemological self-reflection” onmoral facts, so-
cial relations, consciousness, and freedom. These kinds of things
could not be studied usingmethods from the natural sciences, which
aimed to formulate universal, atemporal laws of nature. ButDilthey
argues socio-historical reality cannot be reduced to a single princi-
ple or formula. Similarly, the human sciences (politics, anthropol-
ogy, sociology, etc.) could not be founded on the approach based on
the mechanical, mathematical model that Laplace used to predict
the behavior of astronomical bodies [71, pg. 39].
GWF Hegel. Hegel’s philosophical project is notoriously compli-
cated, but for our purposes we only consider a few important ideas
in their more modern form. Hegel famously explained the human
need for self-recognition in his master-slave dialectic. For Hegel,
12The categorical imperative roughly states: one should only act according to a rule
which one would also will to be a universal rule for all others in any particular
circumstance.)
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self-consciousness arises from the recognition of oneself by “oth-
ers,” who are also self-conscious agents engaging in a kind of mu-
tual recognition. The “slave” is marginalized in the sense that his
“self-consciousness is incomplete since he cannot find a reflection
of his own autonomy and personhood in the master’s eyes” [20, pg.
57]. In other words, self-realization–recognizing oneself as “self”–
fundamentally depends on the social recognition of other autonomous
objects (persons in society) who recognize your existence as an
individuated person with unique desires and goals. Our personal
identities depend on this. If we are to see ourselves as independent
and autonomous agents, we are required to see others this way too
[20, pg. 57]. Hegel did not see us as disembodied Cartesian egos,
but as fundamentally interdependent and social creatures embed-
ded in social environments.
Hegel represented amajor advance fromKant in that he rejected
the idea of an ahistorical, abstract, static, and universal faculty of
“reason” separate from historical practices and cultural attitudes
[38, pg. 62]. In its place, Hegel inserted a teleology, or final goal,
to reason towards which it inexorably moved in its quest for self-
realization [62]. Hegel’s addition of a temporal, historical aspect to
logic means that something may be both A and not-A, perhaps at
a different time. This idea will influence thinking about narrative
identity over time.
Recently, social theorist and philosopher Axel Honneth updated
these Hegelian ideas to include psychological notions of self-confidence,
self-esteem, and self-respect in identity formation [61]. TheHegelian
twist is that these can only be acquired through intersubjective,
social experience with others. Honneth believes that justice and
mutual recognition of personal identity are intrinsically related:
“The justice or wellbeing of a society is measured according to
the degree of its ability to secure conditions of mutual recogni-
tion in which personal identity formation, and hence individual
self-realization, can proceed sufficiently well” [61]. Hegel’s ideas
about identity, dialectic, and mutual recognition have been devel-
oped and used by prominent gender theorists, such as Judith But-
ler, and various social movements for marginalized social groups,
which are founded on claims of identity and autonomy [103, pg.
9].
JG Hamann and JG Herder. Hamann and Herder were the quintes-
sential anti-Enlightenment thinkers who opposed Kant’s glorifica-
tion of universal, abstract reason. Hamann influenced the younger
Herder and saw himself fighting against the increasing quantifica-
tion and mechanization of life after Newton. Hamann’s attack on
Kant and other champions of reason could today be just as eas-
ily directed at the data scientist. Enlightenment thinking enables
the treatment of men as machines. Science, Hamman claims, was
once an expression of our finite and creative capacity, but has now
become a “dictator which determines [our] position, morally, po-
litically and personally” [12, Ch. 5, Par. 20].
Herder is arguably the first to give voice to the modern notions
of authenticity, personal expression, belonging, and incommensu-
rable ideals [11, Ch. 3, Par. 26]. When we speak of “authenticity,”
or “living one’s truth,” we draw on Herder’s thought. For Herder,
each of us has an original way of being human, making our quest
for authenticity and self-realization unique [101, Ch. 3, Par. 9]. Nor-
malization should happen within, not between persons. Art is re-
ally the expression of a person’s unique voice, attitude, and way
of life of its author. Consequently, the object of art is inseparable
from the identity of the artist; the subject could not be arbitrarily
chopped off from the object without also destroying the identity
of the object. Moreover, Herder was one of the first to speak of a
shared language and soil as a bond between persons [11, Ch. 3, Par.
31]. Group identity and belonging confers a recognizable pattern
to the activities of its members, giving rise to distinctive cultures,
such as “German” or “Chinese” ways of doing things. There is no
“universal” language or identity as human understanding is rooted
in the shared symbols and languages of this root society.
Lastly, Herder rejects the Enlightenment desire to find determi-
nate answers to all questions by the application of a single method
whose resultsmight be reduced to a set ofmutually derivable propo-
sitions [11]. Given our natural penchant for expression and be-
longing, Herder urged us to develop what we are to the fullest ex-
tent we can, to articulate our particular views in the richest way.
Herder’s praise of diversity was the apparent antidote to Enlight-
enment unity. Todaywe see his ideas taking resurfacing in identity
politics, postmodern relativism, and nationalism.
Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard’s ideas can be simply summarized
as the primacy of the subjective over objective. Kierkegaard’s legacy
is the way in which he contrasted the Enlightenment universalism
of Kantian ethics (his so-called categorical imperative) with the
uniqueness and “singleness of the single one” [9, Ch. 7, Sec. 3, Par.
6]. Kierkegaard and others after him rejected the idea that the par-
ticularities of individual situations should be abstracted away from
in order to reach universal rules of conduct all reason-possessing
persons could re-derive. Instead, the particularities of the individ-
ual situation are primary: (lived, embodied, fleshly) existence pre-
cedes essence (abstract, faceless, unitary). He thus rejected the Kan-
tian distinction of an unknowable abstractmetaphysical realm from
an observable, predictable, realm of experience. Kierkegaard con-
ceived of human existence inherently textured by self-defining choices
which are “too dense, rich, and concrete” to be represented as atom-
istic concepts [9, Ch. 7, Sec. 2, Par. 9]. The human experience can-
not be abstracted into a concept, but must be lived, experienced,
and embodied as a subject of life.
3.5 Philosophical Lessons for RS Design
From Kant’s moral philosophy, we might claim that nonconscious
behaviors are outside the realm of the moral because they were not
the result of applying a universal maxim. This means that asser-
tions about our logged behaviors reflecting our interests and pref-
erences are not trulymoral statements, which seems contradictory.
After all, we might define our interests as preferences precisely
as those things which we believe to be good. In any case, a Kan-
tian might conclude that if the logged behavior used to make pre-
dictions and recommendations stems from nonconscious sources,
these should not be taken to represent our moral identities.
From the Romanticists Hamann and Herder, we might claim
that that data scientists at BBD platforms create “arbitrary divi-
sions of reality” (i.e., selectively log behaviors in apps and devices)
in order to build “castles in the air” (predictive models of one’s
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“true” preferences) [11]. Put into today’s language, pre-defined cat-
egories of recorded behavior, which are in turn used by RS to make
predictions, are categories of the data scientist’s choosing and do
not exhaust the reality of the data subject as he interacts with a de-
vice or app. Even in so-called “context-aware” recommender sys-
tems [1], interpretations of the various contexts are one-sided and
fail to account for contested interpretations by the data subject.
This problem will become worse if BBD platforms continue mov-
ing towards reinforcement learning-based RS.
From Hegel’s story of the master-slave relationship we can de-
rive an important principle for participatory RS design. We claim
the GDPR’s right of access and modification can support this dual-
process of identity formation, particularly when combined with
a narrative approach that evolves over time. Much as the master-
slave dialectic shows, downloading and viewing one’s logged be-
haviors used by an RS permits one to see oneself from the gaze of
the system designer and potentially choose to change one’s self-
understanding as a result. At the same time, the act of negotiating
meaning on the part of RS designers opens the possibility of en-
larging their own self-understanding as a result of understanding
the differing perspectives of others.
From Kierkegaard, we could view the GDPR and its rights that
allow one to obtain, modify, and delete one’s data potentially con-
front one with a series of self-defining choices. At the same time,
Kierkegaard would object to most RS “personalization” that relies
on optimization of a global objective function on aggregate users’
data, since the parameters of such a function are not strictly related
tomy personal data alone. Similarly, Kierkegaard might argue that
CF and its reliance on the logged behaviors of others is irrelevant
for my particular choice.
4 NARRATIVITY AND NARRATIVE
IDENTITY
The story of human communication properly begins in logos, or
discourse. Logos subsumed the concept of everything from word,
thought, narrative, story, to reason and rationale [37]. Only later,
through a distinction made betweenmythos and logos by Plato and
Aristotle, did logos become associated with a specific kind of philo-
sophical and technical discourse, leaving us with the word logic
today. Mythos, on the other hand, became associated with poetry,
while rhetoric uneasily fell somewhere in between [37].
Thework of JacquesDerrida has notably questioned the assump-
tions behind this split, which has deeply influenced the course of
Western metaphysics and mathematics. Other important thinkers,
such as Jürgen Habermas and Chaim Perelman [84], have tried
to reclaim reason’s original connection with rhetoric, communi-
cation, and dialog as a compromise position.
Today, the modern concept of narrative plays an increasingly
unifying role in a variety of disciplines, from clinical, developmen-
tal, social, and cognitive psychology to philosophy, literature, and
even neuroscience [25, 97]. The discussion here drawsmostly from
the philosophical perspective. Our claim is that narrative identity,
with its dynamic and diachronic aspects, can unify both moral and
social identity and possesses an explanatory force that accounts
for human meaning and experience.
Self and Identity. According to identity theorists in sociology and
psychology, the self is fluid and occupies multiple social roles or
group identities that coexist and vary over time. The dynamism of
the self-concept is reflected in its numerous representations. Per-
sons have representations of a past, present, and future self; and
also an ideal, “ought,” actual, possible, and undesired self [73]. Iden-
tity theorists highlight how a unified self-conception arises from
the variety of meanings given to various social roles the self occu-
pies [100].
Social and Moral Identity. Common types of social identities relate
to one’s ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, job, and relation-
ships. People may also identify strongly with their gender, sexual
orientation, and various other “stigmatized” identities, such as be-
ing homeless, an alcoholic, or overweight [28].13 Social psycholo-
gists generally agree our self-concept is one of the most important
regulators of our behavior.
Psychologist and linguist Michael Tomasello contends that our
membership in a linguistic community binds our social and moral
identities. The reasons we give for our behaviors are related to our
role and statuswithin this community. Starting at a young age, chil-
dren must make their own decisions about what to do and which
moral and social identities to form [105, pg. 288]. Children make
these decisions in ways justifiable both to others in their commu-
nity and to themselves. The connection between the social and the
moral lies in the way in which the reason-giving process to others
was, in time, internalized into a form of normative self-governance.
Our psychical unity requires we do certain things in order to con-
tinue to be the persons we are, seen from both the inner perspec-
tive (self, private) and outer (other, public).
Personality psychology has also begun to study the formation of
moral identity. For example, [3] show how highly important moral
identities–the collection of certain beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors
relating to what is right or wrong–can provide a basis for the con-
struction of one’s “self-definition.” In short, our social and moral
identities are crucial to both our self-understanding and our un-
derstanding of others.
Narrative Identity. Our real focus, however, is on narrative identity,
as it encompasses both moral and social identity. Moral and social
identities are synchronic (cross-sectional) structures. They are how
we represent ourselves to ourselves at particular points in time. But
we have not yet explained how these identities evolve over time.
For that, we need a diachronic (longitudinal) account of identity.
The discussion below largely follows work by the influential
psychologist Jerome Bruner and the philosopher Paul Ricoeur. Ac-
cording to Bruner, narratives “[operate] as an instrument of mind
in the construction of reality” [15] and consist of many unique fea-
tures including:
• Diachronicity: narratives account for sequences of ordered
events over human time, not absolute “clock time.”
• Particularity: narratives are accounts of temporally-ordered
events told from the particular embodiment of their narra-
tor(s).
13Most of these social identities would be sensitive personal data under the GDPR, and
they would be reviewable and modifiable by data subjects themselves.
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• Intentional state entailment: within a narrative, reasons
are intentional states (beliefs, desires, values, etc.) which act
as causes and/or explanations.
• Hermeneutic composability: gaps exist between the text
and the meaning of the text. Meaning arises from under-
standing relations of parts to whole.
• Canonicity andbreach: narratives aremore than just point-
less “scripts.” They often arise in order to explain an anoma-
lous event after the fact.
• Referentialility: realism in narrative derives from consen-
sus, not to correspondence to some “true” reality.
• Genericness: there are cultural patterns to various narra-
tives, each expressing a version of human plights and tragedies.
• Normativeness: if narratives arise after breaches, this pre-
supposes certain norms guiding our expectations aboutwhat
will/should happen.
• Context sensitivity and negotation: readers of a text “as-
similate it on their own terms” thereby changing themselves
in the process. We negotiate meaning via dialogue.
• Accrual: an individual narrative can spread throughout a
culture, thereby allowing it to grow and evolve collectively.
In contrast to Bruner’smore psychological account, Paul Ricoeur
combines an account of ethics with narrative identity. His goal is
nothing less than to express a vision of the “good life with and for
others in just institutions” [89, pg. 240]. The philosophical question
he poses is: how can one and the same person grow and change
over time? How can such seemingly contrary concepts as identity
and diversity be reconciled in one person?
He answers via the notions of idem and ipse identity [89]. Idem
is synonymous with sameness, typically associated with our char-
acter. Ipse is selfhood of self-constancy. It is what allows others to
count on a person, and what makes him accountable when making
promises to others. Ricoeur’s narrative account solves the problem
of connecting permanence in time of character (sameness) with
self-constancy (a kind of promise to vary within limits) [89, pg.
166].14 Through the diachronicity of narrative, we unite our moral
and social identities over time, giving rise to the uniqueness of per-
sons. Good narratives and literature arise from imaginative varia-
tions between these two poles of sameness and selfhood over time.
Ricoeur understands the self as fundamentally the “character-
narrator” of its own history, “emplotted” between conflicting de-
mands for concordance and a natural, entropic drive towards dis-
cordance [89, pg. 141]. Emplotment confers a unity, an internal
structure and completeness to the story [89, pg. 143], giving one
a coherent life story. However, if the discordance between events
in the plot becomes too great, one’s identity becomes threatened.
If the discordance grows too wide, one’s personal identity can dis-
solve in an “identity crisis.” Similarly, schizophrenia may be viewed
as an example where the coherence of one’s narrative identity has
unraveled.
Similar to Aristotle’s notion of mythos, narrative events differ
from mere occurrences by virtue of a certain “effect of necessity”
or expectation from which they arise. Much as Bruner describes,
only after the fact do events become part of a narrative and their
14Ricoeur states that self-constancy is the response of “Here I am!” when someone in
need asks “Where are you?” [89, pg. 165].
configuration within this narrative–their relation as a part to the
whole of the story–is what accounts for their meaning and explana-
tory force [89, pg. 142]. We can only understand the conclusion
of a narrative by reference to the earlier parts of the story which
brought us there. As philosopher Charles Taylor puts it, “what we
grasp as an important truth through a story–be it that of our own
life, or of some historical event–is so bound up with how we got
there–which is what the story relates–that it can’t simply be hived
off, neglecting the chain of events which brought us here” [102, Pt.
III, sec. 8].
Unlike scientific observations or chronicles of events in sequence,
experiences recounted in narratives always have somemoral tinge
of approval or disapproval, rightness or wrongness. Relating to the
hermeneutical issues of context, Ricoeur writes that imputability
is the “ascription of action to its agent, under the condition of eth-
ical and moral predicates” [89, pg. 292]. Finally, in narrative the
notion of absolute time is unnecessary because the character has
the power to initiate a “beginning of time,” and assign a beginning,
middle, and end to an action [89, pg. 147].
4.1 Narrative Accuracy and Epistemic Injustice
In this section we now attempt to bring together narrative identity
and narrative accuracy using [44]’s concept of epistemic injustice.
In philosophy, epistemology is the study of knowledge and its foun-
dations. In order to apply her ideas to the realm of RS, wewill, how-
ever, need to take some interpretive liberties. This discussion will
ground the ethical vocabulary for thinking about and discussing
the narrative accuracy of RS and their training data.
Typically injustice is understood as a kind of fair or fitting dis-
tribution of goods–one receives what one is properly owed. That
is not quite what Fricker means by the term, as credibility is not
really a finite good [44, pg. 20]. She is interested in injustice as it
relates to disrespecting one in one’s “capacity as a knower.” The as-
tute reader will recognize the Kantian themes here: Fricker starts
from the premise that we know ourselves best and have an equal
stake in truth claims. As [93, pg. 8] point out, epistemic injustice
“undermines individuals’ trust in their own judgment and reason-
ing [and diminishes] their sense of intellectual agency.” There is
equally a Hegelian aspect to epistemic injustice in that it requires
a mutual recognition of the perspective and experience of others,
particularly those in positions of asymmetrical epistemic power
(i.e., data subjects relative to data collectors).
Testimonial andHermeneutical Injustice. Fricker develops two forms
of epistemic injustice applicable to the case of data subjects re-
ceiving personalized recommendations. First, testimonial injustice
might occur when prejudice or bias leads a data collector to give
a “deflated level of credibility” to a data subject’s interpretation
of a recorded action or event, including a recommendation [44,
pg. 1]. For example, if a data collector only uses nonconsciously-
generated BBD and does not weight explicit feedback, a kind of
testimonial injustice has occurred. Another example might be that
a BBD platform allows users to “downrate” bad recommendations,
but these are not actually factored into changing to the recommen-
dations. From a Bayesian perspective, we can also conceive of testi-
monial injustice an example where uncertainty in model selection
(ignoring the subjective “model” of the data subject) is ignored in
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favor of the pre-defined model of the RS designer. Even more gen-
erally, we can view it as examples of the problem of data fusion, or
information quality, with ethical implications.
In contrast, hermeneutical injusticemay arise when a data collec-
tor or data collection platform lacks the “interpretive resources” to
make sense of the data subject’s lived experience, thereby putting
him at a disadvantage [44, pg. 1]. The fundamental question is,
what counts as what? Currently the categories of events recorded
by BBD platforms are typically pre-defined by system designers
without any input from platform users, for instance. If designers of
RS systems do not consider the diversity and richness of data sub-
jects’ intended actions, values, and goals while using the system,
hermeneutical injustice will be unavoidable. Under one interpre-
tation of an event, we may generate statistical regularities, while
under another we may get different statistical regularities which
become encoded in the parameters of ML models. It follows there
is no one “best” representation or encoding of BBD. There are sim-
ply different representations under different interpretations about
what counts as what.
Oneway to potentiallymitigate this would be for BBDplatforms
to ask users for explicit clarification of the meaning of key events
and actions recorded within an app and used in predictive algo-
rithms to generate recommendations. We saw earlier that RL sys-
tems are at particular risk for hermeneutical injustice towards their
data subjects.
With these ideas in mind, we can say the narrative accuracy of
RS can be low through either weighing certain kinds of evidence
too low, or when failing to negotiate the meaning of events or
recommendations with data subjects. Fortunately, the GDPR gives
data subjects some legal tools for engaging with and modifying
their personal data generated and stored on BBD platforms. So if
data subjects exercise their rights under the GDPR, and RS design-
ers move away from BBD towards more explicit feedback, as in
[35], narrative accuracy can be shaped and improved in a commu-
nicative process with the data subject.
This whole process of seeing oneself through the eyes of oth-
ers (the BBD platform and the RS recommendations) leads to self-
realization and the opportunity to reflectively endorse certain be-
haviors online under a more appropriate description, as seen from
the perspective of the data subject. When data subjects can choose
the description underwhich their actions take place and are recorded,
it opens the possibility of understanding their experience online
instead of forcing it to fit the designers’ interpretation of “what
counts as what.” This communicative process of narrative shaping
through dialog with the data subject can be seen as one approach
to participatory design of RS.
4.2 The Dangers of Subjectivity and Narrative
The downside to emphasizing the subjectivity of human experi-
ence in narrative form is that we might lose the possibility of a
common, inter-subjective understanding of “truth.” This is a fre-
quent criticism of postmodern thought. The thinking goes that we
must therefore accept nihilism, or its equally-disagreeable twin,
relativism. But doing so would be to open the door to difference
and creativity, only to close it by being overwhelmed by what we
find.
Fortunately,many thinkers have already grappledwith this prob-
lem. Although they agree there is no one single method that can
deliver absolute knowledge, we can find minimal criteria of sound-
ness that can provide a practical grounding for a theory of truth.
For instance, we might try to articulate “principles of charity” [26]
in interpreting and “good faith” in constructing narratives. We briefly
sketch two attempts at grounding the truth claims of narrative
knowing.
The philosopher Marya Schechtman has described two “con-
straints” on the content of such personal narratives, if we are to
realize our self-interests, get moral credit for our efforts, and take
responsibility for our actions. These are the reality constraint and
the articulation constraint. According to [5, pg. 79] the reality con-
straint requires narratives to have some minimal level of coher-
ence with reality. The articulation constraint says that the maker
of a narrative must be capable of some minimal level of reflective
articulation of one’s actions and thoughts in order to properly be
responsible for them.
In communication studies, Walter Fisher elaborated the notion
of narrative rationality and gave qualitative criteria for assessing
it [37]. Fisher’s criteria for assessing narratives break down into
1) narrative probability (coherence): does the story hang together
and is it free of contradictions?; and 2) narrative fidelity (correspon-
dence): are the reasons given logically sound and do they reflect a
consistent set of values? [110].
These examples show that by embracing narrative forms of knowl-
edge, we are not forced to abandon all criteria and any hope for con-
sensus on “truth.” In fact, as the pragmatist philosopher Richard
Rorty has famously argued, social convention, rather than repre-
sentational similarity, can serve as the basis for a theory of truth
[90]. In Rorty’s version of pragmatism, truth is defined relative to
human goals and purposeswhich are articulated through a process
of communication and social consensus over time.
5 CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, AND
FUTURE WORK
Humanistic personalization aligns with the spirit of Human Cen-
teredAI [95].Making and sustaining a coherent digital self-narrative
is a uniquely human capacity which we cannot leave up to others
or outsource to automated agents. This sentiment is shared by the
GDPR and IEEE EAD principles. We are characters in the stories
we tell about ourselves. We knowwhich events define us, we know
which values drive us, we know the causes (reasons) behind our ac-
tions. And if we do not, we have the capacity to try to find out.
The corporate owners of BBD collection platforms and RS de-
signers maymake claims to the contrary based on our observed be-
haviors, butwe believe that rights to informational self-determination
trump these assertions. Humanistic personalization promotes indi-
vidual autonomy [81] by cultivating unique desires and personal-
ities and by giving us the chance to create our own “moral laws”
which guide us in our decisions and explain our actions.
Ultimately, as postmodernists have pointed out, problems of ethics
and interpretation are inseparable.What we believe to be true influ-
ences our decisions about what is right. But if meaning is socially
constructed, data subjects alone cannot solve these problems. It
will take both a community and good faith communication towork
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out the “rules” of our common language game. The designers of RS
will need to play a larger role in this dialectic of meaning negoti-
ation and identity formation in the digital sphere. After all, if the
original meaning of category is to “publicly accuse,” the data sub-
ject, as a member of the public, should play a part in that process.
A major limitation of our GDPR-based approach is that we as-
sume our readers will agree with the European conception of the
human person we have laid out. We assume readers share similar
beliefs aboutwhat makes a human person unique and which capac-
ities might be so essential as to require rights (and corresponding
duties) to secure them. In an increasingly splintered yet intercon-
nected digital world, searching for grand narratives of reason and
truth appears misguided. Yet we believe the compromise position,
based on narrative understanding and the dialogic participation of
diverse groups, is the only way to avoid relativism and nihilism.
Beyond personalization, a focus on narrative could have wide-
ranging consequences for the future of AI/ML. If we are to ever
“crash the barrier of meaning in AI” [78], we will need to crash
through the barrier of narrative. Further, the inherent intelligibil-
ity of narrative could be useful in the emerging area of explain-
able AI, especially where regulations such as the GDPR give data
subjects rights to clear, understandable explanations of algorith-
mic decisions. Lastly, due to its intuitive “explanatory force” [108],
narrative explanation could serve as a interesting lens for new ap-
proaches in causal modeling. How are events in narratives caused,
and how can this be reconciled with claims of causation deriving
from induction and observation?
Skeptics might counter that optimizing for narrative accuracy
will require a trade-off in the ability of RS to accurately recommend
items and predict specific behaviors–particularly non-conscious
ones. Business profits may also be affected. Data scientists may
need re-training. Nevertheless, the GDPR forces us to ask the ques-
tion: Do we ultimatelywish to represent ourselves according to the
needs and interests of business or humans?
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